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Individual Differences
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of Psychological, Social and Behavioural Sciences, Coventry University, Coventry, United Kingdom
Numerous individual differences, models, and measures have been associated with
the ‘emotional intelligence’ (EI) label. This paper discusses one of the most pervasive
problems regarding EI-related individual differences, namely, the lack of a meaningful
theoretical framework. First, drawing upon existing theoretical frameworks, we argue
that EI-related characteristics can be considered constituents of existing models of
cognitive ability (ability EI), personality (trait EI), and emotion regulation (EI competencies).
Second, having differentiated between these perspectives (ability, personality, and
emotion regulation), we draw upon existing theory and research to build the
Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences (IMAID), which provides an
initial mechanistic representation that explains how the different EI-related constructs
are likely to interrelate and coalesce to influence affective outcomes. In essence,
the IMAID is an integrated mediation model in which emotion regulation mediates
the effects of ability EI and affect-related personality traits upon outcomes. Viewing
EI-related constructs as interrelated extensions of well-established individual difference
frameworks clarifies some pervasive misconceptions regarding EI-related characteristics
and provides scholars and practitioners with a clear and useful theoretical framework
ripe for exploration. We conclude by using the IMAID to suggest a theoretically driven
agenda for future research.
Keywords: emotional intelligence, individual differences, emotion, intelligence, personality, emotion regulation
INTRODUCTION
Emotional intelligence (EI) is a label assigned to a wide array of individual differences that has
been widely adopted by scholars and practitioners. Despite this popularity, numerous concerns
regarding the theoretical nature of EI-related constructs remain. Taken literally, EI should be
a combination of emotion and intelligence. Emotions are considered affective episodes with a
perceptual or intellectual component (e.g., perception and appraisal of emotional cues) that hold
the property of intentionality (e.g., jealousy toward another or shame toward oneself; Mulligan and
Scherer, 2012). Emotions are often triggered and guided by at least one appraisal of a stimulus
(e.g., an impending exam) and are associated with physiological and/or cognitive change(s) (e.g.,
increased heart rate and self-doubting thoughts; Mulligan and Scherer, 2012). Intelligence is
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defined as a “mental capability that. . . involves the ability
to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend
complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience”
(Gottfredson, 1997, p. 13). Adopting this emotion plus
intelligence (or cognitive ability) perspective, Salovey and Mayer
(1990, p. 189) defined EI as the cognitive abilities required
to “monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions,
to discriminate among them and to use this information to
guide one’s thinking and actions”. Salovey and Mayer’s (1990)
conceptualization of EI was discussed within academic circles but
a more generalized version of EI was rapidly adopted following
the publication of Goleman (1995) “Emotional Intelligence: Why
it can matter more than IQ”. Figure 1 shows this surge in interest
in terms of the prevalence of the term ‘EI’ within journal articles.
The popularized notion of EI included constructs not
captured by Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) cognitive ability model,
including motivation, empathy, social skills, happiness, and
achievement-orientation, amongst others (Goleman, 1995; Bar-
On, 1997). In response, EI researchers diversified, developing
a myriad of substantively different definitions and measures –
all under the EI label (Locke, 2005). The rapid and piecemeal
development of EI measures outstripped meaningful theoretical
advancements and the commercialization of EI tools exacerbated
inconsistencies in terminology, measurement, and empirical
findings (Locke, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008).
It is not uncommon for newly proposed constructs to outstrip
meaningful theoretical development (Shaffer et al., 2016), partly
because producing construct labels, definitions, and measures is
easier than developing meaningful theory, and partly because
the latter is based upon the former. Thus, the fact that we
now have many conceptualizations and operationalizations of
EI is not necessarily a problem. Indeed, it is argued that
FIGURE 1 | Prevalence of the term ‘emotional intelligence’ in journal articles
hosted in the PubMed database between 1985 and 2016.
“when authors begin to map out the conceptual landscape of
a topic they should err in favor of including too many factors,
recognizing that over time their ideas will be refined” (Whetten,
1989, p. 490). The numerous conceptualizations of EI each have
their merits but growing concerns regarding their theoretical
status can no longer be left unchecked (Locke, 2005; Zeidner
et al., 2008). Paramount amongst these concerns are questions
regarding what EI actually is, the extent to which the different
EI-related constructs are distinct, and which constructs, if any,
are redundant manifestations of ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Locke,
2005; Zeidner et al., 2008).
The lack of clarity surrounding EI has led some to dismiss
certain elements of the EI literature, and some to dismiss EI
completely (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Locke, 2005). We too
are skeptical of EI but believe that calls for complete rejection
are premature. Before we can confidently reject or retain the
various conceptualizations of EI, we need two things: clear
and concise definitions that provide clear boundaries for each
EI-related construct, and a theoretical framework that describes
how they relate to each other and to the broader individual
differences arena. Only with such an integrative theoretical
framework can we determine whether EI has any scientific
value.
Previous papers have provided taxonomies of EI-related
constructs aimed to prevent researchers and practitioners from
generalizing across the different ‘types of EI’ (e.g., Ashkanasy
and Daus, 2005; Van Rooy et al., 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008).
Typically, these taxonomies have been based upon measurement
tools, measurement approaches (e.g., maximal performance vs.
self-report), or have focused on differentiating ability EI from
other models (e.g., Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Zeidner et al.,
2008; Joseph et al., 2015). Each of these approaches has been
useful, but none has yet developed into a meaningful theoretical
framework that can be used to rigorously evaluate the full
range of EI-related constructs or prevent conceptual confusion.
Indeed, some classifications, such as the ‘mixed model’ grouping,
which is atheoretical by definition, is confusing, of little scientific
utility and arguably exacerbates rather than reduces conceptual
confusion and false claims (e.g., Joseph et al., 2015). In contrast,
we aim to proffer a framework that draws not from the
inherent quirks of EI measures but from the wider individual
differences literature. Specifically, in the first part of the paper
we argue that EI-related constructs can be accommodated within
well-established theoretical frameworks that describe cognitive
ability, personality, and emotion regulation. In doing so, we
remove the need for terms such as ‘mixed EI,’ and provide a
simple but powerful framework to classify EI-related constructs.
Having introduced this theoretically informed classification, the
second contribution of the paper is to present the Integrated
Model of Affect-related Individual Differences. This model
provides an initial mechanistic representation that explains how
the different EI-related constructs are likely to interrelate and
coalesce to influence affective outcomes. By differentiating and
integrating EI-related individual differences, we hope to provide
scholars and practitioners with a clear and useful framework
that will provide a platform for theoretical refinement, measure
development, and future research.
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PERSPECTIVE 1: EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AS COGNITIVE
ABILITIES
The theoretical backdrop to ability EI research is synonymous
to that of general cognitive abilities, essentially, that individuals
differ in their cognitive capacity to recognize, comprehend, and
manage emotions in much the same way as individuals vary
in their capacity for numerical reasoning or spatial awareness
(Mayer et al., 2001). However, the existence of ability EI as a
form of intelligence has been the subject of contentious debate
(Mayer et al., 2001; Locke, 2005). The two major criticisms have
been philosophical (e.g., are emotions rational/logical processes?)
and measurement-based (e.g., can a question on emotion have
an objectively ‘correct/incorrect’ answer?). These two points of
debate have been fiercely argued elsewhere and so we do not
revisit them here (c.f. Bowman et al., 2002; Locke, 2005; Zeidner
et al., 2008; Mestre et al., 2016). Instead, we examine the empirical
evidence for considering ability EI as a constituent of broader
models of cognitive ability, such as the Cattell–Horn–Carroll
model (Schneider and McGrew, 2018).
Ability EI research has drawn predominantly on the Salovey
and Mayer (1990) model and operationalized the construct
using the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
(MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002; formerly the MEIS; Mayer et al.,
1999). This model proposes four emotion-related abilities,
namely, the perception (accurately perceiving emotions),
facilitation (using emotions to aid performance), understanding
(comprehending how emotions arise and develop), and
management (regulating one’s own or others’ emotions) of
emotions (Mayer and Salovey, 1997).
The MSCEIT has been the most popular measure of
ability EI and the measure and construct are often considered
synonymous. Researchers have recently acknowledged that
additional measures of ability EI are needed, in part because
a single measure is unlikely to provide sufficient evidence for
the existence of the construct (Mestre et al., 2016) and also
because there have been a number of notable critiques regarding
the psychometric properties of the MSCEIT (e.g., Matthews
et al., 2004; Maul, 2012). For example, the perception factor has
demonstrated inconsistent correlations with other measures of
emotion recognition (e.g., Matthews et al., 2003; Roberts et al.,
2006) and the facilitation branch does not hold in factor analyses,
with facilitation measures loading on to the perception and
management factors (e.g., Roberts et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2010).
Indeed, numerous studies now provide support for a hierarchical
three-factor model, with emotion perception, understanding,
and management correlating highly and loading onto a single
higher-order ability EI factor (Fan et al., 2010; MacCann et al.,
2014).
Despite the measurement problems, evidence in favor of an
affect-related strand of intelligence is mounting. There is clear
evidence that individuals consistently differ in their ability to
perceive and understand emotions (Mestre et al., 2016). Further,
both the general ability EI factor and the three sub-factors
are strongly correlated with measures of cognitive ability but
remain somewhat distinct (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004;
MacCann, 2010; MacCann et al., 2014). The most robust
investigation of ability EI within the cognitive ability domain
comes from MacCann et al. (2014) who tested various factor
models examining the structural relations of ability EI tests
and tests of general cognitive ability. The best fitting models
all situated ability EI-loaded by tests of emotion perception,
understanding and management – as a second-stratum factor
of general intelligence alongside fluid intelligence, crystallized
intelligence, quantitative reasoning, visual processing, and broad
retrieval ability. Across the different factor models, ability EI
typically loaded onto g at around 0.80, a similar magnitude to
the other broad domains of cognitive ability tested (MacCann
et al., 2014: Table 6). MacCann et al. (2014) concluded
that ability EI was best considered as a sub-domain of
general cognitive ability within a broad Cattell–Horn–Carroll
(CHC) model of intelligence (Schneider and McGrew, 2018).
Further, emerging data suggests that the various EI branches
have developmental trajectories similar to closely related
cognitive abilities. For example, emotion perception decreases in
adulthood as do to other sensory-modality abilities, and emotion
understanding/management continues to increase across the
lifespan akin to other knowledge-like abilities (Mestre et al.,
2016).
Although ability EI can be considered a sub-factor of existing
general cognitive ability models, that does not mean it is
redundant or lacking in utility. Indeed, evidence suggests that
ability EI predicts a number of important outcomes when
controlling for general cognitive ability and other individual
differences (e.g., Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004; Newman et al.,
2010), with the incremental prediction most pronounced when
the outcomes examined are emotion-laden (e.g., job performance
in roles requiring high emotional labor; Joseph and Newman,
2010).
In sum, ability EI, or individual differences in the ability
to recognize, understand, and (knowledge of how to) manage
emotions appear to exist and fit within a broader cognitive
ability framework (MacCann et al., 2014; Mestre et al., 2016).
Ability EI shares numerous features with other elements of
cognitive ability and provides useful information in explaining
emotion-laden outcomes (Mayer et al., 2001; Van Rooy and
Viswesvaran, 2004; Joseph and Newman, 2010). The evidence
summarized here supports a conclusion that ability EI can be
considered a sub-factor of general cognitive ability.
PERSPECTIVE 2: EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AS PERSONALITY
TRAITS
The second perspective on EI was pioneered by Petrides
and colleagues and is termed ‘trait EI.’ The definition
of trait EI has evolved over time, from a construct that
represents “behavioral dispositions and self-perceived abilities”
(Petrides and Furnham, 2001, p. 426), to “emotion-related
dispositions” (Petrides et al., 2007b, p. 273), and most recently
to the “constellation of emotional self-perceptions located at the
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lower levels of personality hierarchies” (Petrides, 2010, p. 137).
A large body of evidence demonstrates that trait EI is unrelated
to ability EI (correlations are often near-zero; Van Rooy et al.,
2005; Petrides et al., 2007a). Thus, we can say that trait EI and
ability EI represent two distinct perspectives on EI, with ability EI
linked to individual differences in intelligence and trait EI linked
to individual differences in personality. However, there remains
uncertainty regarding the extent to which trait EI replicates traits
within existing personality models or captures a new dimension
of personality.
Personality refers to the relatively stable traits that influence
a person’s typical pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving
(Hughes and Batey, 2017). Given this, trait EI should refer
exclusively to typical affective tendencies and not self-perceived
abilities, which are distinct from personality (Chamorro-
Premuzic and Furnham, 2004). However, as noted above, trait
EI has shifted over time from a mixed construct (dispositions
and self-perceived abilities) to a personality construct and it
seems that current measures of trait EI still contain questions
concerning self-perceived abilities (e.g., I would describe myself
as a good negotiator; I believe I am full of personal strengths).
This is not surprising given that the trait EI program did not
start out to identify the “comprehensive representation of the
affective aspects of personality” (Petrides et al., 2016, p. 336)
that it now claims to capture. Nevertheless, future research needs
to refine trait EI measures so that they focus exclusively on
personality.
The most popular measure of trait EI, the TEIQue
(Petrides, 2009), has a general factor that can be broken into
four-sub-factors and a further 15 facets, two of which are
considered auxiliary facets that do not load onto any of the
four sub-factors (see Table 1). Early exploratory factor analytic
evidence showing that some trait EI facets formed a factor
separate to the Big Five (Petrides and Furnham, 2001; Petrides
et al., 2007b), combined with evidence of modest incremental
prediction (beyond short measures of the Big Five; Petrides et al.,
2007a), was interpreted as indicating the discovery of a major new
personality dimension (Petrides et al., 2007b; Pérez-González and
Sanchez-Ruiz, 2014).
However, later research demonstrated substantial overlap
between existing personality measures and trait EI measures (e.g.,
57% of trait EI variance is accounted for by the Big Five factors),
suggesting that trait EI was not that new or that major (Pérez-
González and Sanchez-Ruiz, 2014). Indeed, when examining
Petrides et al.’s (2007b, Table 4) joint factor analysis of the TEIQue
and a measure of the Big Five, there is substantial overlap. Five
trait EI facets had no substantial loading on the trait EI factor
but did load substantially on other Big Five factors. Six trait EI
facets either had their primary loading on a Big Five factor or had
substantial loadings on both trait EI and one of the Big Five. Four
trait EI facets loaded primarily onto the trait EI factor and had no
meaningful cross-loadings. So, of the fifteen TEIQue facets, five
are best considered markers of the current Big Five, and a further
six can quite easily be incorporated within the Big Five model.
What this analysis reveals is that the vast majority of trait EI facets
are best considered markers of the Big Five, not as markers of a
new trait construct. Indeed, based on a qualitative review of item
TABLE 1 | TEIQue facets and similarities to the Big Five.
TEIQue sub-factor and facets Similar constructs found
within the NEO PI-R
Emotionality
Emotion perception Feelings (O)
Trait empathy Tender-mindedness (A)
Emotion expression Hostility (N), anxiety (N)
Relationships –
Self-control
Emotion regulation –
Stress management Vulnerability (N), anxiety (N)
Impulsiveness Impulsiveness (N)
Sociability
Assertiveness Assertiveness (E)
Emotion management –
Social awareness –
Self-esteem Competence (C)
Well-being
Trait happiness Positive emotions (E),
depression (N)
Trait optimism –
Auxiliary facets
Adaptability –
Self-motivation Achievement striving (C)
content, we have illustrated further overlap between trait EI and
the Big Five within Table 1.
Despite the substantial overlap between trait EI models and
the Big Five, Petrides et al.’s (2007b) analyses suggest that
four facets (social awareness, emotion management, emotion
expression, and trait empathy) are unique from the Big Five.
In addition, our qualitative review suggests that some facets do
not have direct equivalents in extant models. Thus, it is possible
that trait EI research has identified meaningful personality
traits that can inform and expand existing personality models.
This is especially useful given that current omnibus models of
personality (e.g., the Big Five) are not comprehensive in their
coverage of the personality sphere (Hughes and Batey, 2017), and
this is particularly true for tendencies relating to positive affect
(e.g., Pytlik Zillig et al., 2002). Indeed, a number of the ‘unique’
trait EI facets, representing positive affect or low neuroticism, are
not currently captured by the Big Five (e.g., emotion regulation,
adaptability, and optimism). This might explain why the factors
of well-being and self-control, which subsume these facets,
often provide incremental prediction when examined alongside
existing personality measures (Andrei et al., 2016).
So, trait EI measures capture a number of affect-related or
affect-laden personality traits that span the whole spectrum of
personality (i.e., facets from each of the Big Five and seemingly
beyond). Having measures that provide a “comprehensive
representation of the affective aspects of personality” (Petrides
et al., 2016, p. 336) is undoubtedly useful for both research
and practice (i.e., identifying which facets to measure during
employee selection, Hughes and Batey, 2017). However, whether
existing trait EI measures achieve this is debatable. The research
that is now needed to achieve comprehensive coverage of
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affect-related personality facets involves two major steps. First,
research must identify which facets of trait EI models and
measures are unique and which are redundant. Second, existing
personality measures (i.e., Big Five measures) need to be
examined in order to identify other affect-related facets (e.g.,
anxiety and warmth) that are currently absent from trait EI
models.
In sum, whilst trait EI research is not as clear-cut as ability
EI research, we can draw several important conclusions, namely
that trait EI is distinct from ability EI and that trait EI is, in
essence, a collection of affect-related personality traits. In order
to make this overlap and theoretical perspective explicit, from
this point, we refer to this perspective without using the term
‘intelligence.’ Instead, we refer to this perspective as ‘affect-related
personality.’ Using a unique label was not a lightly taken
decision because whenever novel terminologies are introduced
the risk of confusing matters increases. We considered the term
‘personality trait EI’ or retaining ‘trait EI.’ However, on reflection,
we considered that it would be more confusing to use term
‘intelligence’ when referring to a collection of personality traits.
PERSPECTIVE 3: EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AS EMOTION
REGULATION
The third broad grouping of EI-related constructs commonly
discussed pertains to Emotional and Social Competencies (e.g.,
Goleman, 1995; Boyatzis, 2009). EI competencies are “observed
when a person demonstrates. . . self-awareness, self-management,
social awareness and social skills at appropriate times and ways
in sufficient frequency to be effective in the situation” (Boyatzis
et al., 2000, p. 344). This definition is so broad that almost any
intrapersonal or interpersonal behavior could be classified under
this definition, and many have been. Indeed, EI competency
models include constructs synonymous with personality (e.g.,
conscientiousness, optimism; Joseph et al., 2015), constructs
concerning the regulation of one’s own and others’ emotions (e.g.,
emotional self-control, empathy, and conflict management) and
a broad array of performance outcomes (e.g., teamwork, service
orientation, innovativeness, social responsibility, leadership; Bar-
On, 1997; Boyatzis et al., 2000; Boyatzis, 2009).
The varied nature of these models has led numerous
authors to refer to them as ‘mixed models’ (e.g., Joseph
et al., 2015), with mixed models frequently and justifiably
criticized for their lack of theoretical clarity (Mayer et al.,
2000; Daus and Ashkanasy, 2003; Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005;
Locke, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2008). Indeed, when a construct
is so broad that it can reasonably accommodate almost
everything it is essentially protean and thus meaningless (Hughes,
2018). ‘Valid’ constructs have clear definitions, clearly defined
content, and clear boundaries (Hughes, 2018). Competency
EI models have none of these features (Locke, 2005; Zeidner
et al., 2008). In addition, competency measures share larger
correlations with measures of other constructs than each other
(Brackett and Mayer, 2003), have low internal consistency and
test–retest reliability (Zeidner et al., 2008), incoherent and
inconsistent factor structures (Livingstone and Day, 2005), and
when considered alongside personality, intelligence, and self-
perceptions, have little predictive value (Joseph et al., 2015).
Given the lack of supporting evidence (and quite damning critical
evidence), we concur with the previously espoused views that
EI competencies represent a proportion of the EI literature that
could be abandoned (e.g., Mayer et al., 2000; Brackett and Mayer,
2003; Daus and Ashkanasy, 2003; Zeidner et al., 2004, 2008;
Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Locke, 2005). Indeed, the continued
use of EI competency models is likely to do “much more harm
than good” (Daus and Ashkanasy, 2003, p. 70) when seeking
to build coherent theoretical accounts of affective processes and
related individual differences.
Although we see no meaningful future for current EI
competency models, we do see that the general aim of
assessing emotional competence and integrating it within a
broad framework of emotion-related individual differences is
of value. As noted above, the constructs included within
competency models span three domains: personality, broad
performance outcomes, and emotion regulation. Within the
delineation of emotion-related constructs we present, the
personality component is captured under the ‘affect-related
personality’ (e.g., trait EI) banner, so any personality constructs
here would represent construct proliferation, and the broad
performance outcomes cannot reasonably be considered affect-
related individual differences. However, we would argue that the
elements related to emotion regulation do have a place within the
broad domain of affect-related individual differences. Thus, we
would prefer to see such work move away from EI competencies
and focus instead on emotion regulation, which represents ‘the
use of strategic cognitions or behaviors to improve or worsen
[one’s] own feelings and those of other people, in the pursuit of
hedonic, relational and instrumental goals’ (Niven et al., 2011,
p. 71). In essence, emotional competence and emotion regulation
are aiming to address the same phenomenon, namely, using
emotions to facilitate goal attainment. In Table 2, we have noted
some clear areas of overlap between emotion regulation models
and EI competencies.
Given that EI competencies and emotion regulation are both
concerned with the same phenomena and the clear overlap in
core constructs (see Table 2), it makes sense to consolidate the
two fields to avoid construct proliferation (i.e., the proposition
and marketing of multiple ostensibly unique but actually largely
overlapping constructs). This consolidation is likely, in our view,
to lead to the abandonment of EI competencies in favor of
emotion regulation for three main reasons:
First, emotion regulation has well-developed theories such as
the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 2015).
According to this model, there are five classes of emotion
regulation: (i) choosing situations to engage with or avoid
(situation selection), (ii) modifying that situation (situation
modification), (iii) directing attention within the situation
(attentional deployment), (iv) attributing a meaning to the
situation (cognitive change), or (v) altering the response to
the situation (response modulation). At all five stages, different
emotion regulation strategies can be adopted and if implemented
successfully can facilitate goal-attainment (Gross, 2015). Some
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example strategies are displayed in Table 2. The process model
of emotion regulation has recently been extended to consider
a significant gap noted by the model’s author, namely, how
individuals come to choose which emotion regulation strategy to
adopt. Specifically, Gross proposed three key antecedents to the
enacting of emotion regulation, namely, identification, selection,
and implementation (Gross, 2015). As we will discuss later, we
see a prominent role for ability EI and affect-related personality
traits in explaining individual differences in identification (i.e.,
how capable/prepared people are to pay attention to emotions),
selection (i.e., the ability to identify an appropriate emotion
regulation class), and implementation (i.e., the specific behavioral
nuances with which people enact their regulation).
At this point, it is worth noting how emotion regulation
differs from ability EI and in particular the management branch,
which is sometimes referred to as the regulation branch (Joseph
and Newman, 2010, 2015). Emotion regulation as we have
noted above refers to processes and behaviors regarding the
up-regulation and down-regulation of emotions. The emotion
management branch of ability EI refers to crystallized knowledge
regarding these processes and behaviors. In other words, the
difference between knowing that consuming alcohol will not
improve one’s mood, and drinking it regardless. The two are
interrelated, but they are not synonymous, one is knowledge and
the other is action.
Second, although EI competency models refer to broad
outcomes (e.g., optimism or influence), emotion regulation
models focus on the specific strategies utilized (see Table 2).
For example, optimism can be obtained and maintained through
positive reappraisal and the use of self-enhancing humor (Scheier
and Carver, 1987), whilst influence can be gained in a number of
ways, including appropriate displays of anger (e.g., Sy et al., 2005;
Côté and Hideg, 2011). This focus on specific strategies provides
a greater insight into the processes behind affective phenomena
(Mestre et al., 2016) and thus can lead to more specific theories
and useful practical guidance (i.e., training programs).
Third, emotion regulation measures are superior to EI
competency measures in terms of theoretical coherence and
psychometric properties (c.f., Matthews et al., 2003; Bridges et al.,
2004). For example, one of the most widely used measures, the
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John, 2003)
differentiates between re-appraisal and suppression strategies
guided by theoretical models (Gross, 1998; Gross and John, 2003).
In addition, the ERQ scales demonstrate adequate reliability,
a stable factor structure, and provide prediction of numerous
socially important outcomes (e.g., depression, anxiety, stress,
interpersonal functioning, well-being, social adjustment, and
decision-making; see Spaapen et al., 2014).
In sum, both emotional competence and emotion regulation
are attempting to address the same phenomenon: using emotions
to facilitate goal attainment. However, only emotion regulation
actually achieves this. Compared with EI competency models,
emotion regulation models are built on stronger theory, contain
more specific construct identification, inspire better measures,
and show better predictive properties. Thus, we believe that
researchers interested in emotional competence or skill should
avoid EI competency/mixed models and instead focus on models
of emotion regulation. The integration of EI research with
emotion regulation echoes a call from Mestre et al. (2016,
p. 327) who recently stated that, ‘studying EI through the
theoretical framework of emotion regulation may produce
greater understanding of the mechanisms by which EI capacities
influence valued outcomes.’ We agree with Mestre et al. (2016)
and see great value in the integration of EI and emotion
regulation (see also Hughes and Evans, 2016). In the next section,
we expand upon these claims by building an integrative model
that combines ability EI, affect-related personality traits, and
emotion regulation.
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF
AFFECT-RELATED INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES
Using the aforementionedtheoretically informed classification,
the second major goal of this paper is to introduce the Integrated
Model of Affect-related Individual Differences. This model aims
to provide an initial mechanistic representation that explains how
the different EI-related constructs are likely to interrelate and
coalesce to influence affective outcomes. By differentiating and
integrating EI-related individual differences, the current paper
aims to provide scholars and practitioners with a clear and useful
TABLE 2 | Overlaps between emotion regulation classes, emotion regulation strategies, and outcomes currently considered to be emotional intelligence competencies.
Emotion regulation class
(Gross, 2015)
Example emotion
regulation strategies
(Peña-Sarrionandia
et al., 2015)
Example emotional
intelligence competency
(Boyatzis, 2009)
Situation selection Avoidant-coping
Forecast accuracy
Emotional self-awareness
Empathy
Situation modification Conflict resolution
Social support search
Conflict management
Influence
Attentional deployment Rumination
Distraction
Cognitive change Positive reappraisal
Humor
Optimism/positive outlook
Response modulation Venting/suppression
Substance use
Emotional self-control
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framework that will provide a platform for theoretical refinement,
measure development, and future research.
Previous influential models or classifications of EI-related
constructs (e.g., trait vs. ability; stream 1, 2, and 3; ability vs.
mixed) have typically been based on sub-optimal definitions or
measurement tools (e.g., Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; Zeidner
et al., 2008; Joseph et al., 2015). For example, Ashkanasy and
Daus (2005) influential classification proposed three streams
each based on a certain measurement approach, namely, ability
EI tests, self- or other-reported ability EI, and EI competency
measures. Whilst such groupings have utility in distinguishing
among measures, they are, by nature, atheoretical and fail to
provide a solid platform for theoretical development. Equally,
previous reviews have tended to adopt an ability EI vs.
others (mixed models, trait EI, competency) approach and as
a result, researchers have tended to treat the different EI-
related constructs as competitors. Indeed, there have been
numerous papers pitting the different EI models against
each other with a view to identifying which EI is the
‘correct’ or ‘best’ EI (e.g., Mayer et al., 2000; Zeidner et al.,
2008).
In contrast, we have used the broader individual differences
literature as the basis for our classification of EI-related
constructs and were not bound by existing measurement tools
or deficient definitions (e.g., mixed models). As a result, our
classification addresses calls to provide clear boundaries, aligned
with traditional individual differences theory, for each of the
major EI-related constructs (Zeidner et al., 2004). Importantly,
this means that these different EI-related constructs are no
longer in direct competition but can instead be viewed as
complementary. Rather than conducting predictive validity
competitions, pitting different EI measures against each other and
other individual differences, we can instead focus on building
and testing meaningful theoretical models that explain how
individual differences in ability EI, affect-related personality, and
emotion regulation interrelate to influence affective behavior
(e.g., Seal and Andrews-Brown, 2010; Hughes and Evans, 2016;
Mestre et al., 2016). Accordingly, we now propose a model that
integrates the three perspectives.
The key principles of the Integrated Model of Affect-related
Individual Differences are as follows. We propose that ability
EI (a sub-factor of cognitive ability) and affect-related
personality traits (a collection of affect-related personality
traits) drive the identification, selection, and successful
implementation of various emotion regulation strategies. In
turn, emotion regulation influences important outcomes.
A visual representation of the Integrated Model of Affect-related
Individual Differences is presented in Figure 2. In essence, this
is an integrated mediation model in which emotion regulation
mediates the effects of ability EI and affect-related personality
traits upon outcomes (Joseph and Newman, 2010; Côté et al.,
2011; Hughes and Evans, 2016; Mestre et al., 2016; Szczygieł
and Mikolajczak, 2017). The model is inspired by and builds
upon previous integrations of personality, intelligence, and skills
that have proven successful in explaining behavior in other
domains (e.g., McClelland, 1973; Zeidner, 1995; Chamorro-
Premuzic and Furnham, 2004). Perhaps the key strength of
the model is that it provides a testable framework that has the
potential to explain how individual differences in ability EI
and affect-related personality manifest in diverse behavior and
differential outcomes. The model goes beyond simple descriptive
correlations and direct effects that have dominated previous
research and instead seeks to explain how affective outcomes
arise through the dynamic interactions between affect-related
individual differences. As a result, the Integrated Model of
Affect-related Individual Differences focuses not simply on what
is predicted by EI-related constructs but how these constructs
influence outcomes. A greater understanding of how EI-related
constructs interact and the nature of the mechanisms by
which they influence outcomes stands to inform future theory,
measurement, and intervention design.
A few previous papers have proposed and/or partially tested
models that integrate some EI-related constructs (e.g., Joseph
and Newman, 2010; Seal and Andrews-Brown, 2010; Peña-
Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Mestre et al., 2016). However, none
of these models have included all unique elements of the EI
literature, all have been bound by existing measurement tools
and poorly defined constructs (e.g., mixed models), and most
have not considered EI-related constructs within the broader
individual differences literature. For example, Seal and Andrews-
Brown (2010) posit mediated and moderated relationships
between three measures, which they label emotional ability
(Salovey and Mayer, 1990), emotional quotient (Bar-On, 1997)
and emotional competence (Goleman, 1995). The latter two
are considered ‘mixed models,’ overlap substantially, and as
discussed above have been heavily criticized from theoretical
and empirical standpoints. This model also fails to provide
theoretically meaningful links to the broader literature or draw
clear boundaries separating these constructs. As a result, its
utility for theory building is limited. In contrast, Mestre et al.
(2016) present compelling evidence supporting the positioning
of ability EI as a sub-factor of general cognitive ability. They
go on to argue that emotion regulation could be the process by
which ability EI influences outcomes. This link was supported
by a previous meta-analysis demonstrating associations between
ability EI scores and emotion regulation (Peña-Sarrionandia
et al., 2015). The Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual
Differences builds upon this paper positing emotion regulation
as the mechanism through which EI-related constructs influence
outcomes. However, it extends this discussion beyond ability
EI to include affect related personality traits. Further, as we
discuss in more detail below, the model also posits that individual
differences in emotion regulation are most likely driven by both
ability EI and affect-related personality traits (Hughes and Evans,
2016).
Overall, the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual
Differences makes several key contributions to the literature.
First, by tying each EI-related construct to existing models of
individual differences it provides a clear, theoretically coherent,
and parsimonious description of the three key perspectives.
Second, the model posits EI-related constructs not as competitors
but as complementary constructs that are meaningfully entwined
and which coalesce to produce emotion-relevant behavior. Third,
through this integration, the model provides a framework that
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FIGURE 2 | Integrated model of affect-related individual differences. G, general factor of intelligence; Gf, fluid intelligence; Gc, crystallized intelligence; N,
neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; ARP, affect-related personality traits; Emotion reg., emotion regulation.
can explain how individual differences in ability EI and affect
related personality traits influence patterns of emotion regulation
and subsequently socially important outcomes. In the following
sections, we discuss integration further and review extant
empirical evidence in support of the key pathways hypothesized.
The Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual Differences
is inherently causal but most EI research is cross-sectional and
correlational in design. Because such designs do not model
data in a manner that is appropriate for determining causal
relationships (Antonakis et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2018), where
available, studies adopting experimental designs, which are better
suited to examining causality, are noted (Antonakis et al., 2010).
PATHWAY 1: G→ ABILITY EI
As discussed above, ability EI satisfies a number of important
criteria to be considered a cognitive ability (Van Rooy and
Viswesvaran, 2004; MacCann et al., 2014; Mestre et al., 2016).
More specifically, current evidence suggests that ability EI is best
conceived of as a second-order factor of cognitive ability that
is hierarchically structured, consisting of a general factor and
three sub-factors, namely, the ability to perceive, understand,
and manage emotions (Fan et al., 2010; MacCann et al., 2014).
Essentially, ability EI reflects the cognitive capacity to process
emotion-laden information (Mayer et al., 2016).
PATHWAY 2: BIG FIVE→
AFFECT-RELATED PERSONALITY
TRAITS
Trait EI represents a compound construct containing affect-
related personality traits (Petrides et al., 2007b; Petrides, 2010).
Given the pervasiveness of the Big Five and Five Factor
Model (FFM) within personality research, and the significant
overlap between trait EI and FFM facets (see Table 1),
it is appropriate to seat the affect-related personality traits
perspective within this model (van der Zee and Wabeke,
2004). Historically, most affect-related personality research
has focussed on global factors (e.g., total trait EI scores).
However, we suggest that this is sub-optimal and potentially
misleading, for two main reasons. First, compared to facets,
broad factors lead to underestimates and/or distorted estimates
of construct relationships (i.e., reduced predictive validity,
Hughes and Batey, 2017). This is especially true when facet
content is diverse (Hughes and Batey, 2017), like it is with
affect-related personality traits, which span all of the Big
Five. Second, factors created from a selective subset of traits
(e.g., TEIQue) might well be misleading due to data pre-
structuring. Briefly, factor solutions are only as strong as the
variables that are entered for factoring, and factors identified
can only be considered to ‘exist’ or be ‘accurate’ if they
are derived from the entire domain of possible variables
(i.e., all affect-related personality facets/items). Given that
this was not the case for measures such as the TEIQue
(which was developed based on a competency EI model), it
is perhaps questionable what the global trait EI and 4 sub-
factors really represent. Indeed, as we discussed, a number of
TEIQue facets do not load on the general factor. Thus, we
think that targeted, theory driven, facet-level analyses are the
way forward (Hughes and Batey, 2017). That is, researchers
should measure the affect-related personality facets that are
relevant to their study. Although for slightly different reasons,
this recommendation echoes recent calls from the pioneers
of the personality based approach to EI (Petrides et al.,
2016).
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PATHWAY 3: ABILITY EI→ EMOTION
REGULATION
Emotion regulation refers to the strategies used to adapt emotions
(e.g., suppress or exacerbate) experienced by the self and others in
order to facilitate goal-attainment (Niven et al., 2009, 2011; Gross,
2015). If you want to achieve the goal of increasing your positive
emotions, you might tell yourself a funny joke. If you want to
reduce someone else’s anxiety before a test, you might reassure
them. Emotion regulation consists of three main decisions
(Gross, 2015). First, a person must select if/which emotions
need to be regulated in any given situation (identification).
Next, the person must choose when regulation strategies (i.e.,
which of the emotion regulation classes, see Table 1), should
be utilized (selection). Finally, in the implementation phase,
the person must enact the regulation by translating the broad
emotion regulation strategy (e.g., cognitive change or situation
modification) into specific cognitive or behavioral strategies (e.g.,
positive reappraisal or conflict resolution). The identification,
selection, and implementation stages were recently espoused and
understanding them is likely to help explain the existence of
consistent individual differences in the frequency and style of
emotion regulation (Gross, 2015).
The recency with which the identification, selection, and
implementation phases were espoused means that no specific
theory, model, or empirical evidence describes relationships
between the two. However, there is mounting evidence and
increasing theoretical rationale to support a reliable link between
ability EI and the use of emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Joseph
and Newman, 2010; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Hughes
and Evans, 2016; Mestre et al., 2016). For example, a recent
meta-analysis found a number of moderate-strong relationships
between ability EI and emotion regulation strategies spanning
the five major emotion regulation classes (Peña-Sarrionandia
et al., 2015). As an indication of the degree of the relationship,
ability EI reliably predicted the use of nineteen of the 22 emotion
regulation strategies investigated (i.e., 95% confidence intervals
not crossing 0). Importantly, the strength and direction of the
relationships was not uniform, that is, those high in ability EI
do not simply regulate more and/or use a greater number of
strategies. The pattern of relationships suggests that individuals
high in ability EI regulate emotions earlier (which is typically
adaptive), adopt more of the strategies typically seen as adaptive
(e.g., social support seeking), and fewer of those typically seen
as maladaptive (e.g., rumination; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015).
These theoretical and empirical arguments suggest that ability
EI (the cognitive capacity to process emotion-laden information)
is likely to be one of the key determinants of the characteristic
patterns of emotion regulation displayed by individuals (Mestre
et al., 2016).
Experimental research in the field is mostly convergent, with
ability EI linked to effective mood maintenance and repair
following mood induction via film clips (positive and negative,
respectively; Ciarrochi et al., 2000). Similarly, ability EI has been
associated with lower worry and avoidant coping during stressful
tasks (Matthews et al., 2006). Furthermore, using eye-tracking
equipment during an experimental protocol, Davis (2018) found
a general orienting preference whereby emotion management
was associated with avoidance of negative emotion (anger).
However, higher levels of ability EI are not always considered
positive, with some relationships with higher cortisol reactivity
and thus slower recovery from stress (Bechtoldt and Schneider,
2016).
In sum, whilst experimental studies are rare, those available
are broadly consistent with survey studies and support the notion
that ability EI is likely to be one antecedent of emotion regulation
style. Indeed, it would be surprising if an individual’s ability
and knowledge pertaining to the perception, understanding, and
FIGURE 3 | Possible interactions between the sub-factors of ability EI and personality traits in explaining the identification, selection, and implementation of emotion
regulation strategies.
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management of emotions were unrelated to emotion regulation.
Although speculative here, it might be expected that meaningful
relationships will emerge between the perception factor of ability
EI and the identification stage of emotion regulation, between
understanding and selection, and between management and
implementation (see Figure 3, discussed below).
PATHWAY 4A AND 4B: AFFECT-RELATED
PERSONALITY→ EMOTION
REGULATION
Whilst ability EI correlates with emotion regulation, it alone does
not explain emotion regulation (Mayer et al., 2016). There is a
well-documented gap between ability and behavior; individuals
with similar levels of ability EI adopt diverse emotion regulation
strategies, some of which can be unproductive (e.g., Côté
et al., 2011). Both theoretical rationale and empirical evidence
suggest that personality also plays a role in guiding individual’s
emotion regulation (Côté et al., 2011; Davis and Humphrey,
2014; Fiori, 2015; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Hughes and
Evans, 2016). Personality traits shape individuals’ preferences,
attentional focus, and interpersonal behavior, all of which are
likely to influence one’s choice of emotion regulation strategy
(e.g., Côté et al., 2011; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). Indeed,
meta-analytic estimates suggest that affect-related personality
traits are associated with emotion regulation in a similar fashion
to ability EI. That is, there is a consistent relationship (i.e., 35 of
37 effect sizes calculated presenting 95% confidence intervals not
including 0; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). The nature of these
associations suggest that those who scorer higher on measures
of trait EI tend to regulate earlier and use regulatory strategies
typically considered adaptive more often than strategies typically
considered maladaptive. In addition, effect sizes are, on average,
larger than those reported for ability EI (Peña-Sarrionandia
et al., 2015). Perhaps this is not hugely surprising, in fact, it
would be more surprising if personality did not shape emotion
regulation style, for instance, if those high in trait optimism did
not frequently use positive reappraisals and those high in trait
anxiety did not frequently ruminate.
Experimental results also support a causal relationship
between affect-related personality and emotion regulation. For
example, trait EI was negatively related to psychological and
physiological reactivity when exposed to a stressor (Mikolajczak
et al., 2007) and positively related to exhibition of self-efficacy
and appraising stressful situations as challenges rather than
threats (Mikolajczak and Luminet, 2008). Similarly, affect-related
personality traits have been associated with greater susceptibility
to mood induction, moderating the effect of experimental
stressors on subsequent mood deterioration (Petrides and
Furnham, 2003; Mikolajczak et al., 2009).
Above, we hypothesized that there might be meaningful
relationships between the three primary EI abilities (perception,
understanding, and management) and the identification,
selection, and implementation phases of emotion regulation.
It is also likely that certain affect-related personality traits will
predispose individuals to think and act in specific ways within
these phases. For example, certain traits (e.g., emotion perception
and empathy) might predispose individuals to invest more effort
in monitoring one’s own and others’ emotions (the identification
phase). Other traits (e.g., anxiety or optimism or emotional
expression) might predispose individuals to select certain classes
of emotion regulation (e.g., situation selection or cognitive
change or response modulation) and to implement them using
specific strategies (e.g., avoidant coping or positive reappraisal
or venting). It is also likely that intrapersonal affect-related
personality traits (e.g., stress management) will predict the
regulation of one’s own emotions, whilst the interpersonal traits
(e.g., social awareness) will predict the regulation of others’
emotions.
One of the major mechanisms through which affect-related
personality traits are likely to influence patterns of emotion
regulation, is goals and motives (Figure 2, path 4b). Emotion
regulation is often, if not always, goal-driven (Gross, 2015) and
personality shapes values, goals, and motives (Grant and Mayer,
2009; Parks-Leduc et al., 2015), with affect-related personality
traits likely to influence motives and goals within affect-related
settings (John and Gross, 2004; Hughes and Evans, 2016). It has
been argued that the general goal of emotion-regulation should
be to ‘feel good’ and thus personality is perhaps not that key (e.g.,
Larsen, 2000; Tice et al., 2004). However, empirical evidence does
not support this assertion. Individuals demonstrate considerable
variation in how they want to feel and in the direction in which
they regulate their emotions (e.g., Gross et al., 2006; Tamir,
2016). For example, Heimpel et al. (2002) found that participants
who were low in self-esteem and had recently experienced a
failure/loss did not want to feel immediately better. In contrast,
those high in self-esteem did seek to make themselves feel better.
This multi-study paper showed that the varying regulatory goals
were not due to differences in knowledge or expected affect
changes but reflected dispositional and stylistic preferences that
are almost certainly shaped, to some degree, by personality (e.g.,
Grant and Mayer, 2009; Augustine et al., 2010; Hughes and Evans,
2016).
We believe that a systematic empirical effort to examine
the relationships between affect-related personality and
emotion-regulation goals/motives would be hugely useful
for theoretical development and explaining consistent individual
differences within emotion regulation. A recently published
taxonomy (Tamir, 2016), provides a particularly useful
framework for guiding examinations between personality,
goals, and emotion regulation. The framework consists of
two higher-order classes of motives namely, hedonic and
instrumental, which subsume six lower-order classes (see Tamir,
2016, Figure 1). These lower-order classes lend themselves to
a number of hypotheses regarding affect-related personality
traits. For example, trait sociability (contained with the TEIQue
and most other personality models) is likely to generate goals
and motives that are aligned with the social-instrumental class
identified by Tamir (2016). Accordingly, one might hypothesize
that those high in trait sociability will frequently be motived
to regulate emotions in a social-instrumental manner through
the use of emotion regulation strategies such as social support
seeking and humor use. Similarly, links between trait optimism
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and prohedonic motives (i.e., the motive to feel good) or trait
achievement striving and performance-instrumental motives
could easily be theorized.
In addition, most previous examinations of EI-related
constructs and emotion regulation have focussed almost
exclusively upon on self-regulation (e.g., Peña-Sarrionandia
et al., 2015; Mestre et al., 2016; Tamir, 2016). We believe this
to be an oversight and expect that affect related personality
traits will be of (equal, perhaps even greater) importance to
the approaches adopted when attempting to regulate others’
emotions (Niven et al., 2011). For example, many affect-related
personality traits (e.g., empathy, social awareness) drive an
outward focus that is likely to produce motivations aimed at
appeasing or pleasing others. Such goals are likely to affect
the choices of emotion regulation strategies. For example,
although venting (i.e., verbally complaining about a negative
event) can be a productive self-regulation strategy, it can be
counterproductive for those who receive the venting. It is
possible that those high in empathy or social awareness may
be more likely to consider the consequences of venting for
others and thus suppress their desire to vent in order to
regulate the emotions of others (Hughes and Evans, 2016).
Currently, however, there is a dearth of research exploring
why people engage in other-focused emotion regulation and
the different styles with which they do so (Niven, 2016).
Another recent taxonomy might be of use in guiding future
research is Niven’s (2016) work-specific motives framework
of interpersonal emotion regulation. The framework identifies
eight specific motives which are subsumed under the three
major needs proposed in self-determination theory. The
framework shares a number of commonalities with that
proposed by Tamir (2016). For example, there are different
manifestations of motives depending on whether the broad
goal is hedonic/pleasure or instrumental/performance focussed,
these motives are hierarchically structured, and the lowest-level
of abstraction provides a classification system that would lend
itself to building logical hypotheses positing personality traits as
antecedents of these motives.
PATHWAY 5: INTERACTION BETWEEN
PERSONALITY AND ABILITY→
EMOTION REGULATION
In addition to independent effects, it is also possible that
ability EI and affect-related personality interact in explaining
emotion regulation (Côté et al., 2011; Fiori, 2015; Hughes and
Evans, 2016). For example, Côté et al. (2011) found that when
individuals were high in both ability EI and moral identity,
they were more likely to behave in a prosocial manner, but if
they were high in ability EI and Machiavellianism, they were
more likely to display interpersonal deviance. Importantly here,
higher ability EI was associated with greater performance but
the direction of the performance (prosociality or deviance)
was explained by personality traits. Similarly, Fiori (2015)
found that ability EI interacted with the personality trait of
emotionality (similar to neuroticism, marked by fearfulness,
anxiety, sentimentality and a dependence on social support)
to predict interpersonal effectiveness as assessed through a
presentation task. Here, those high in ability EI and low in
emotionality (i.e., emotionally stable) were the best performers,
whilst those high in ability EI and emotionality were average
performers.
The above evidence demonstrates that both ability EI
and affect-related personality traits are needed to explain
performance. However, all of these studies omit the important
mediating mechanism of emotion regulation and thus likely
underestimate the effects of EI-related constructs and reduce
their ability to explain how the EI-related constructs influenced
the outcomes. As noted above, we also expect that ability EI
and affect-related personality traits will interact to drive both
the selection and implementation of differing emotion regulation
strategies. For example, two individuals equally high in ability EI
with differing levels of trait optimism (a facet of trait EI; Petrides
et al., 2007b) might differ in the speed and frequency with which
they engage in positive interpretations (see Hughes and Evans,
2016 for further discussion). Some preliminary evidence for this
comes from Davis and Humphrey (2012) who found that ability
EI moderated the effects of stressors upon coping strategies
and that trait EI moderated the effects of coping strategies
upon depression. Although not a direct test of the interactions
proposed here, the results suggested that EI-related constructs
do interact with some emotion regulation strategies and showed
that being high in both ability EI and trait EI facilitated effective
coping whereas being high in one or the other was insufficient.
Essentially, there are well-established ability and stylistic elements
to individuals’ patterns of emotion regulation and it is also
possible that these two components can be complementary or
at odds at any given stage of the emotion regulation process
(Izard et al., 2008). If we consider these potential interactions
further, what we might expect to see is a pattern whereby
ability EI accounts for differences in knowledge/ability related
to emotion regulation, personality accounts for differences in
style, and the interaction between these two elements provides
a meaningful insight into individual differences in emotion
regulation. A graphical representation of the main proposed
interaction is contained in Figure 3.
Thus, the Integrated Model of Affect-related Individual
Differences presented here provides a framework to begin address
numerous important questions facing emotion regulation:
“What leads a person to use one rather than another of
the various emotion regulation strategies described by the
process model? . . . the model is silent as to how these various
emotion regulation strategies are actually started or stopped.
What initiates emotion regulation? What directs specific emotion
regulation strategies? And why do some people regulate emotions
successfully while others fail to regulate emotions as they
should?” (Gross, 2015, p. 9).
One interesting additional question concerns the extent
to which the identification, selection, and implementation of
emotion regulation strategies occurs via conscious or implicit
(automatic) processes (Fiori, 2009). The Integrated Model of
Affect-related Individual Differences provides a framework that
could guide initial examinations into the relationships between
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different elements of EI and emotion regulation and the nature of
the cognitive processes underlying them (Fiori, 2009).
PATHWAY 6: EMOTION REGULATION→
OUTCOMES
Finally, we argue that emotion regulation influences meaningful
intrapersonal (i.e., calming oneself before an exam) and
interpersonal (i.e., conflict resolution within a team) outcomes.
There is a wealth of empirical evidence to support this claim
(c.f., Gross, 2015), with emotion regulation playing “a core role
in everyday social life” (Niven et al., 2012, p. 247) with utility
demonstrated across social, health, educational, and occupational
outcomes (Gross, 2002; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). Indeed,
robust links to outcomes have been established using emotion
regulation, EI competency and regulation-competency hybrid
scales (e.g., Austin et al., 2010). Thus, this pathway is well
supported by previous evidence. The novelty here is that we
are arguing that emotion regulation does not simply occur
(Gross, 2015), there are drivers of emotion regulation and
those drivers are affect-related abilities and personality traits.
From this perspective, we can say that emotion regulation
represents the principal mediating mechanism through which
ability EI and affect-related personality traits influence outcomes
(Joseph and Newman, 2010; Hughes and Evans, 2016; Mestre
et al., 2016).
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
The first key contribution of this article was to present a
simple theoretical framework that clearly states what each
EI-related construct is and is not. Specifically, that ability EI
represents an extension to existing cognitive ability models,
affect-related personality (e.g., trait EI) represents a collection
of affective personality traits, and interest in emotional
competence should focus on emotion regulation. To some
researching at the cutting-edge of EI, this might seem a
relatively modest extension of the extant literature. However,
our reading of the EI literature suggests that it is a much-
needed clarification, that explicitly demonstrates that the myriad
of EI-related constructs can be accommodated within well-
established individual difference frameworks, and in doing
so, provides a clear theoretical base and boundaries for
each. Our framework negates the need for atheoretical terms
such as ‘mixed EI,’ is falsifiable, is more descriptive and
explanatory in nature than previously published classifications
(e.g., streams 1, 2, and 3), and is less adversarial because it
does not set the different perspectives as competitors. The
second notable contribution from this paper, the Integrated
Model of Affect-related Individual Differences, comes from
adopting these three perspectives and in drawing the different
EI-related constructs together in a complementary manner.
This model provides an initial mechanistic representation that
explains how the different EI-related constructs are likely
to interrelate and coalesce to influence important emotion-
relevant outcomes through the identification, selection, and
implementation of emotion regulation strategies. Accordingly,
the model also provides a solid platform for empirical
exploration, theoretical refinement, measure development, and
possibly practical application.
Despite its promise, the Integrated Model of Affect-related
Individual Differences is clearly exploratory, and needs
systematic, rigorous, and detailed empirical scrutiny. For
example, some of the pathways proposed (e.g., interaction
between ability and personality vs. separate pathways) could
be argued to represent competing explanations for the same
empirical effect. Hopefully, future research will examine these
competing pathways and provide evidence regarding if/when
each pathway is most pertinent. Nevertheless, the evidence
discussed strongly supports the major premise of the model,
namely, that both ability EI and affect-related personality
traits influence the selection and implementation of emotion
regulation strategies (Côté et al., 2011; Davis and Humphrey,
2014; Fiori, 2015; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015; Hughes and
Evans, 2016). Accordingly, the review presented and the model
proposed lead to a number of implications for future research.
First, calls to completely abandon all EI research (e.g., Locke,
2005) seem misguided. However, concerns regarding construct
proliferation and redundancy do hold merit. Equally, no aspect
of EI is the magical silver bullet often claimed (Goleman, 1995),
instead, elements of the EI literature can be seen as extensions of
existing ability, personality, and emotion regulation frameworks.
Second, our review of research surrounding the Integrated
Model of Affect-related Individual Differences suggests that
piecemeal assessment of EI related constructs will give misleading
findings. Future research interested in explaining emotion
regulation or broader outcomes needs to incorporate measures
of ability and personality, and consider the interactions between
these variables. Equally, studies which estimate direct effects
between outcomes and ability EI or affect-related personality
traits are likely to underestimate the relations due to the omission
of emotion regulation as a mediator.
Third, the research reviewed and the hypotheses made in this
paper suggest that focussing upon global ability EI, broad factors
containing multiple affect-related personality traits, and/or broad
emotion regulation measures is likely to hide important nuanced
relationships. Accordingly, we suggest that future researchers
adopt a more specific approach measuring theoretically relevant
abilities, personality traits (or facets), and regulation strategies.
This call echoes similar calls in other applied domains (e.g.,
individual differences at work, Hughes and Batey, 2017) and calls
made from prominent EI and emotion regulation researchers
(e.g., Gross, 2015; Mestre et al., 2016; Petrides et al., 2016).
Fourth, although our focus in this paper is not on
measurement tools, our review has several implications for the
nature of the constructs referred to under the EI banner and
how they are operationalized. With regard to ability EI, we noted
a number of psychometric misgivings with existing measures
(i.e., lack of reliability, inconsistent factor structure, etc.) that
need to be addressed through future measure development. We
would urge interested readers to see the thoughtful critiques and
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guidance offered by Mestre et al. (2016) in their recent review
on this subject (see Hughes, 2018; Irwing and Hughes, 2018 for
guidance concerning measure development).
Regarding affect-related personality traits, there is an
important need for further measure refinements. Our review of
item level content combined with a number of empirical studies
shows clear overlap between existing personality measures and
personality trait EI measures. What we now need is a systematic
study from the facet level that can identify which trait EI facets
are unique and which are redundant duplications. In addition,
it would be of interest to know which affect-related facets, if
any, currently included within broad measures of personality
(e.g., the NEO-PI-R) have been missed by specific measures (e.g.,
the TEIQue). These two lines of research would allow for the
identification of much more comprehensive list of affect-related
personality facets (see also Laborde and Allen, 2016; Petrides
et al., 2016), which would be of great use to researchers and
practitioners. The concept of EI competencies (e.g., Boyatzis,
2009) is redundant. Models and measures stemming from this
perspective capture personality traits already accounted for,
self-estimates of ability that are not relevant, and some broad
emotion regulation strategies which are better considered within
existing emotion regulation frameworks. Thus, we suggest
that researchers interested in emotional skill or competence
adopt measures of emotion regulation rather than problematic
measures of social and emotional competence.
Fifth, the clear delineation of constructs raises the issue of
nomenclature. We noted at the outset of this paper that logically
speaking any construct labeled EI should consist of both emotion
and intelligence. Currently, only the ability EI perspective meets
this criterion and thus we would recommend that the label ‘EI’
is reserved exclusively for this perspective. We are far from the
first authors to make such recommendations (e.g., Gignac, 2010),
yet, despite previous calls, other EI-related characteristics have
been resistant to change. Nevertheless, appropriate nomenclature
is crucial for effective scientific communication and for reducing
misconceptions. Thus we suggest that from now on, authors
refer to ability EI (for affect-related intelligence), affect-related
personality traits (for affect-laden personality measures such as
those currently referred to as trait EI), and emotion regulation
(for measures that concern goal-oriented use of emotions).
CONCLUSION
In this review, we have outlined three theoretical perspectives
on EI and proposed the theoretically driven Integrated Model
of Affect-related Individual Differences as a stepping-stone
toward building a greater understanding of EI-related individual
differences and subsequent affective phenomena. This model
posits that despite often being pitted against each other, the
different perspectives are actually meaningfully entwined and
coalesce to produce emotion-relevant behavior. We hope that
our review and model will serve to guide future research and
theoretical development. Although we should continue to be
skeptical of EI, and actively criticize overblown claims based
on atheoretical models and measures, we hope that this review
demonstrates that all is not lost with regards to EI-related
constructs.
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